International Trade, Differentiated Goods and Strategic Asymmetry

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Abstract: We scrutinize international trade arising from oligopolistic rivalry (reciprocal dumping) in a model where the goods are horizontally differentiated and where otherwise symmetric firms located in different regions adopt asymmetric strategies – one competing in prices and the other competing in quantities. Uni-directional and intra-industry trade appear endogenously in our framework. We show that as trade costs decline the equilibrium outcome will transition from autarky through a region of uni-directional trade, before intra-industry trade ultimately arises. In the uni-directional trade region, potential market entry by the rival has an impact on firm behavior even though the rival is not exporting. The gains from trade are asymmetric in general, due to firms’ asymmetric strategies, and sufficient product differentiation is required for trade to welfare dominate autarky especially with one of the trade partners adopting aggressive strategic behavior even when trade is costless.

Keywords: Intra-industry trade, product differentiation, gains from trade, asymmetric strategies

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Abstract

We scrutinize international trade arising from oligopolistic rivalry (reciprocal dumping) in a model where the goods are horizontally differentiated and where otherwise symmetric firms located in different regions adopt asymmetric strategies – one competing in prices and the other competing in quantities. Uni-directional and intra-industry trade appear endogenously in our framework. We show that as trade costs decline the equilibrium outcome will transition from autarky through a region of uni-directional trade, before intra-industry trade ultimately arises. In the uni-directional trade region, potential market entry by the rival has an impact on firm behavior even though the rival is not exporting. The gains from trade are asymmetric in general, due to firms’ asymmetric strategies, and sufficient product differentiation is required for trade to welfare dominate autarky especially with one of the trade partners adopting aggressive strategic behavior even when trade is costless.

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1 Introduction

One of the most surprising results in international trade theory is that trade may occur even when goods are homogeneous and shipping is costly. As a consequence of international strategic rivalry, it is well-known that this so-called ‘reciprocal dumping’ may not be beneficial if trade costs are sufficiently large. Following the seminal contributions of Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983), which consider quantity competition, an extensive literature has developed exploring the implications of different forms of strategic interaction. Bernhofen (2001) introduced product differentiation, while Clarke and Collie (2003) considered price competition (see also the recent extensions by Friberg and Ganslandt, 2008, and Fujiwara, 2009). The reciprocal dumping concept has been extended to other international transactions (see, for example, Baldwin and Ottaviano, 2001, and Koska et al., 2018, on FDI, and Oladi et al., 2014, on outsourcing). Recent contributions by Brander and Spencer (2015) and Ishikawa and Tarui (2018) have considered the implications of endogenous product differentiation and endogenous transport costs, respectively.
While the literature has focused on the contrasts between trade in the context of price and quantity competition, the implications of asymmetric strategic behavior for trade have not been well established. In theory, several factors (e.g., technological, institutional and demand asymmetries, product differentiation, asymmetric set-up or contract-switching costs, or mixed oligopolies) may lead firms to commit to different strategies (i.e., a price/quantity contract); see, for example, Tremblay and Tremblay (2011), Chao et al. (2018), and Tremblay et al. (2013). Such different strategies are applicable also in the context of international trade as suggested by Maggi (1996). One example is provided by Schroeder and Tremblay (2015), who argue that such a situation may hold true if firms from a low-income country face capacity constraints and compete against firms without such constraints from a high-income country. Empirical evidence supports theory and suggests situations where competing firms do in fact adopt different strategies. Schroeder and Tremblay (2015) and Schroeder and Tremblay (2016) point to different strategies adopted by exporters of mass-produced versus custom-made goods. Similarly, such situations have been observed in the market for small cars and in the aerospace connector industry in the US (see, for example, Tremblay and Tremblay, 2011, for details), and in the Japanese home electronics industry (see, for example, Sato, 1996, for details). We would like to delineate international trade in such a situation: each firm in our model produces differentiated goods and faces international transportation costs when servicing their rival’s market, and competes against the rival firm by adopting a different strategy (i.e., one firm commits to a price contract, while the other firm commits to a quantity contract). In particular, we analyze the implications for the pattern of trade, the conditions under which it will arise, and the consequences for economic welfare.

A number of interesting results emerge from the analysis. In our partial equilibrium framework, trade of both the uni-directional and/or bi-directional (intra-industry) variety arise endogenously. We show that there is a region of trade costs for which trade is uni-directional before intra-industry trade ultimately develops. Within this region the behavior of the exporting firm in its own market is impacted by the existence of a potential rival despite the fact that the rival is not active in that market. Once intra-industry trade does occur, it will be asymmetric in terms of both magnitude and benefit. Moreover, we show that trade is not necessarily superior to autarky for all participating countries in this context, even when there are no trade costs (although it is necessarily superior for at least one).
In the next section we describe the model setup, and characterize the possible equilibrium outcomes in each market. In Section 3 we derive the welfare implications of reductions in trade costs under various circumstances. In Section 4 we consider the role played by the degree of product differentiation in the model in more detail. Concluding comments and some suggestions for future work follow.

2 The Model

Consider a two country world, with countries Home and Foreign. Two related goods (1 and 2) are produced by a single firm located in Home and Foreign, respectively, with a constant marginal/average cost of production, \( c \), common to the two firms, and no fixed costs. Firm 2 can service the Home market, and Firm 1 the Foreign market, only via exports. International transportation costs take the iceberg form, so selling \( x \) units of a good requires shipping \( x/g \) units in either direction, where \( 0 < g < 1 \).

On the demand side, we follow Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984) and assume that the utility of a representative household in Home takes the form

\[
\text{utility} = q_0 + \alpha (q_1 + q_2) - \frac{1}{2} [2\gamma q_1 q_2 + (q_1^2 + q_2^2)],
\]

where \( q_0 \) is consumption of a numéraire good. Concavity of the function and substitutability between 1 and 2 implies \( 0 < \gamma \leq 1 \).

Utility maximization yields the inverse demand functions in the Home market for goods 1 and 2:

\[
p_1(q_1, q_2) = \alpha - q_1 - \gamma q_2, \tag{1}
\]

\[
p_2(q_1, q_2) = \alpha - q_2 - \gamma q_1. \tag{2}
\]

We assume exactly the same household utility structure in Foreign. Hence the model is symmetric. We introduce an asymmetry only in the strategies: Suppose Firm 1 strategically chooses price, while Firm 2 chooses quantity. It is then convenient to express the demand system in terms of the strategic variables \( p_1 \) and \( q_2 \). In the Home market we have:

\[
q_1(p_1, q_2) = \alpha - p_1 - \gamma q_2, \tag{3}
\]

The \( \gamma \) parameter represents an inverse measure of the degree of product differentiation. Where \( \gamma = 0 \), the products are completely distinct. Setting \( \gamma = 1 \) is equivalent to assuming the products are homogeneous.
\[ p_2(q_2, p_1) = \alpha(1 - \gamma) - (1 - \gamma^2)q_2 + \gamma p_1. \]  \hspace{1cm} (4)

By virtue of segmented markets, we can determine the market outcome in Home and Foreign independently. We begin with Home. Using (3) and (4) the profit functions are:

\[ \pi_1 = (\alpha - p_1 - \gamma q_2)(p_1 - c), \]  \hspace{1cm} (5)
\[ \pi_2 = \left[ \alpha(1 - \gamma) - (1 - \gamma^2)q_2 + \gamma p_1 \right] q_2 - cq_2 / g. \]  \hspace{1cm} (6)

Notice that the marginal cost of supplying the Home market for the Foreign firm is \( c/g \) because of the cost of international shipping. Differentiating (5) with respect to \( p_1 \) and (6) with respect to \( q_2 \) yields the implicit best response functions:

\[ \alpha - 2p_1 - \gamma q_2 + c = 0, \]  \hspace{1cm} (7)
\[ \alpha(1 - \gamma) - 2(1 - \gamma^2)q_2 + \gamma p_1 - c/g = 0. \]  \hspace{1cm} (8)

Assuming both firms are active in the Home market, the Nash equilibrium solutions for the domestic sales by Firm 1 and exports by Firm 2 are:

\[ q_1 = \frac{(2 - \gamma^2)(\alpha - c) - \gamma(\alpha - c/g)}{4 - 3\gamma^2}, \]  \hspace{1cm} (9)
\[ q_2 = \frac{2(\alpha - c/g) - \gamma(\alpha - c)}{4 - 3\gamma^2}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (10)

This outcome is stable provided that there is sufficient product differentiation (the requirement is that \( \gamma < \tilde{\gamma} \equiv (\sqrt{17} - 1)/4 \approx 0.781, \) see Tremblay and Tremblay, 2011), which we assume holds throughout the remainder of the analysis. Equilibrium profits are \( \pi_1 = q_1^2 \) and \( \pi_2 = (1 - \gamma^2)q_2^2. \)

The best response functions and a possible equilibrium outcome in which both firms are active in the Home market are illustrated in Figure 1 panel (a), point a. Note that increases (decreases) in \( g \) shift the best response function for Firm 2 in this market to the right (left), while leaving the best response function for Firm 1 unchanged. That is, decreasing transportation costs (a higher \( g \)) would increase the foreign firm’s exports to the Home market at the expense of the Home firm such that Firm 1 would have to adopt a more aggressive pricing strategy (lowering the price of the local...
variety) in the Home market in addition to producing less for the local market.

Figure 1: Best Responses and Nash Equilibrium in Home and Foreign

We now consider the important properties of the equilibrium:

**Proposition 1.** The Foreign firm will export to the Home market provided that transportation costs are sufficiently low.

Proof. From (10), we see $q_2 > 0$ iff $g > \tilde{g} \equiv 2c/[(2 - \gamma)\alpha + \gamma c]$.

Hence, we know that exports can occur from Foreign to Home, provided that trade costs are not too high, and we establish the critical level of the trade costs. Next, comparing Home and Foreign sales in the Home market we find:

**Proposition 2.** Foreign export sales will exceed Home domestic sales if transportation costs are sufficiently low.

Proof. Evaluating (9) where $g = \tilde{g}$ yields $q_1 = (\alpha - c)/2$, which is the monopoly level of production. Foreign exports at this point are zero. By contrast, consider when $g = 1$ (free trade). Now $q_2 = (2 - \gamma)(\alpha - c)/(4 - 3\gamma^2) > q_1 = (2 - \gamma - \gamma^2)(\alpha - c)/(4 - 3\gamma^2)$. It is straightforward to show that $q_1 = q_2$ where $g = c(2 + \gamma)/[\gamma^2(\alpha - c) + c(2 + \gamma)]$.
In Proposition 2 we establish that if Firm 2 does not enter, Firm 1 acts as a monopolist. This is a standard result. But once trade costs fall sufficiently that Firm 2 does enter (i.e., once \( g \) rises to \( \tilde{g} \)), Firm 1 will respond to the increased competition by behaving more aggressively and lowering its strategic variable (price). In equilibrium, however, this price decrease is not enough to increase local output. Due to Firm 2’s entry and the increase in its exports to the Home market as trade gets cheaper (as \( g \) increases), the optimal quantity of the local variety in the Home market will be lower. As trade costs fall further still, domestic production contracts further, while Foreign exports to Home rise, with the latter eventually exceeding the former. Note that the monopoly solution in the Home market in Figure 1 panel (a) is at point \( b \). With \( g = \tilde{g} \), the best response function of Foreign intersects that of Home at this point. It is worth mentioning that in the case of symmetric strategies, this result will not emerge. Only when firms adopt asymmetric strategies, the firm adopting a more aggressive strategy (Firm 1 in this framework) will sell more than its rival not only in the Home market via exports (so long as transportation costs allow for it) but also in its domestic market (as will soon be clear).

We now turn to the Foreign market. The iceberg parameter will appear in the Foreign market equivalent of Firm 1’s best response function, and not in that of Firm 2. Let an asterisk denote economic activities in the Foreign economy. It is straightforward to show that the Nash equilibrium outputs if both firms are active in the Foreign market are:

\[
q_1^* = \frac{(2 - \gamma^2)(\alpha - c/g) - \gamma(\alpha - c)}{4 - 3\gamma^2}, \tag{11}
\]

\[
q_2^* = \frac{2(\alpha - c) - \gamma(\alpha - c/g)}{4 - 3\gamma^2}. \tag{12}
\]

The best response functions and a possible equilibrium outcome are illustrated in Figure 1 panel (b). The equilibrium is stable under the same condition as in the Home market. Note that increases (decreases) in \( g \) shift the best response function for the exporter (Firm 1) in the Foreign market to the left (right), while leaving the best response function for Firm 2 unchanged. That is, increasing transportation costs (a lower \( g \)) would force the exporter in the Foreign market to behave less aggressively (by increasing the price of its variety). In equilibrium, facing a higher transportation cost, Firm 1 will export less to the Foreign market, and the decrease in competition intensity will enable Firm 2 to increase its output of the local variety in the Foreign market. We summarize the
equilibrium outcomes in the following propositions:

**Proposition 3.** The Home firm will export to the Foreign market provided that transportation costs are sufficiently low.

*Proof.* From (11) \( q_1^* > 0 \) iff \( g > \tilde{g}^* \equiv (2 - \gamma^2)c/[(2 - \gamma - \gamma^2)\alpha + \gamma c)] \).

This proposition establishes the conditions under which intra-industry trade may arise. Note that \( \tilde{g}^* > \tilde{g} \) for \( \gamma > 0 \). This means that trade costs must be lower for Home (where the local firm adopts a more aggressive strategy by choosing price over quantity) to export to Foreign than for Foreign (where the local firm adopts a less aggressive strategy by choosing quantity over price) to export to Home. As trade costs decrease (as \( g \) increases above \( \tilde{g} \)), initially (for \( \tilde{g} < g < \tilde{g}^* \)) only uni-directional trade will arise (from Foreign to Home), with intra-industry trade occurring only when trade costs have fallen sufficiently (for any \( g > \tilde{g}^* \)). By comparing (10) and (11) we see that for any \( g > \tilde{g}^* \), \( q_2^* > q_1^* \), i.e., Foreign exports to Home are greater than Home exports to Foreign. Hence, once intra-industry trade arises, it will be asymmetric, which would not be the case had the firms adopted symmetric strategies. Similarly, using (11) and (12) we see that \( q_2^* > q_1^* \) for any \( g \), i.e., unlike in Home, Foreign (where the local firm adopts a less aggressive strategy by choosing quantity over price) always has a market share advantage in its own economy.

Now consider the Foreign firm’s behavior in its own market when the Home firm is not active in that market:

**Proposition 4.** The Foreign firm will act as a monopolist only if trade costs are sufficiently high.

*Proof.* Evaluate (12) at \( g = \tilde{g}^* \) to obtain \( q_2^* = (\alpha - c)/(2 - \gamma^2) \), which is greater than the monopoly level of output for \( \gamma > 0 \). Evaluating (12) at \( \tilde{g} \) by contrast yields the monopoly level of output.

This interesting result contrasts with the Home market. Even though intra-industry trade does not occur for \( g < \tilde{g}^* \) the Foreign firm may nonetheless be impacted by the presence of the Home rival. Threat of entry by the Home firm into the Foreign market can prevent the Foreign firm from fully exploiting its monopoly power. Since \( \tilde{g} \) is both the critical level of trade costs for Foreign to enter the Home market and the critical level for Foreign to exhibit monopoly behavior in its own market, this occurs throughout the uni-directional trade range.
This raises the question of how the Foreign firm behaves when it is active in the Home market and the threat of Home entry to the Foreign market is binding. At $g = \tilde{g}^*$ (12) can be rewritten as $q_2^* = (\alpha - c/g)/\gamma$, which characterizes optimal behavior for $\tilde{g} < g < \tilde{g}^*$. In words, the Foreign firm chooses the quantity of domestic sales that generates a price $p_1^*$ that makes the Home firm just unwilling to enter the Foreign market (i.e., $c/g$). In Figure 1 panel (b), point $d$ is where $g$ is such that the Home firm is just indifferent between entering and not. The Foreign firm would like to lower its output and raise its price (since its output exceeds the monopoly level), but if it does so the demand for its rival’s product will shift out by enough to make exports viable, and the increased competition will lower profit. If $g$ falls slightly, the Foreign firm is able to lower quantity without inducing entry. Hence the Foreign best response function is downward sloping in the range between $\tilde{g}$ and $\tilde{g}^*$. Eventually, if trade costs are high enough, at $\tilde{g}$, the threat of entry will cease to bind, and the best response function becomes vertical at the monopoly level of output. In Figure 1 panel (b) this is point $b$, which corresponds to point $b$ in Figure 1 panel (a).

3 The Gains from Trade

Having established the pattern of trade and the conditions under which it will arise, we now turn to the question of whether or not it is beneficial for the participating economies. Define welfare in each economy as:

$$W = \int_0^{q_1} [p_1(q_1, q_2) - c] dq_1 + \int_0^{q_2} [p_2(q_1, q_2) - p_2] dq_2 + q_1^* (p_1^* - c/g), \quad (13)$$

$$W^* = \int_0^{q_2^*} [p_2^*(q_1^*, q_2^*) - c] dq_2^* + \int_0^{q_1^*} [p_1^*(q_1^*, q_2^*) - p_1^*] dq_1^* + q_2 (p_2 - c/g). \quad (14)$$

The components of welfare in each country are, respectively, the profits and consumer surplus generated by domestic sales, the consumer surplus generated by imported consumption, and the profits generated by export sales.

We first consider the signs of the changes in the welfare index as the world economy transitions from autarky, through uni-directional and on to intra-industry trade. Differentiating (13) and (14) with respect to $g$, and making use of the demand structure and the first order conditions for profit

\footnote{Note that the slope of the home best response function is $-\gamma/2$, whereas the slope of the foreign between $\tilde{g}$ and $\tilde{g}^*$ is $-\gamma$, hence multiple equilibria are excluded.}
maximization by each firm in each market, yields the following general expressions for changes in the welfare index, which are valid for any $g \geq \tilde{g}$:

\[
\frac{dW}{dg} = (\alpha - c - q_1 - \gamma q_2) \frac{dq_1}{dg} + (q_2 - \gamma q_1) \frac{dq_2}{dg} - \gamma q_1^* \frac{dq_2^*}{dg} + cq_1^*,
\]

\[
(15)
\]

\[
\frac{dW^*}{dg} = (\alpha - c - q_2^* - \gamma q_1^*) \frac{dq_2^*}{dg} + (q_1^* - \gamma q_2^*) \frac{dq_1^*}{dg} + \gamma q_2^* \frac{dq_1^*}{dg} + cq_2^*.
\]

\[
(16)
\]

Note that the first bracketed term in (15) is just $p_1 - c$, or equivalently $q_1$. Similarly, the first bracketed term in (16) is $p_2^* - c$, which equals $(1 - \gamma^2)q_2^*$ provided that the both firms are active (or at the threshold of being active) in both markets (i.e., when $g \geq \tilde{g}^*$). Consider the movement from autarky to uni-directional trade:

**Proposition 5.** A small increase in $g$ in the region of $g = \tilde{g}$ will lower welfare in Home and raise welfare in Foreign.

**Proof.** In the region of $\tilde{g}$, $q_2 = q_1^* = 0$. Moreover, since a small rise in $g$ does not induce the Home firm to enter the foreign market, $dq_1^*/dg = 0$. Using the fact that both firms are initially producing/pricing as monopolists, (15) and (16) simplify to:

\[
\frac{dW}{dg} = \frac{(\alpha - c)}{2} \frac{dq_1}{dg} - \gamma \frac{(\alpha - c)}{2} \frac{dq_2}{dg},
\]

\[
\frac{dW^*}{dg} = \frac{(\alpha - c)}{2} \frac{dq_2^*}{dg}.
\]

Since $dq_1/dg < 0$ and $dq_2/dg > 0$ from (9) and (10), welfare will fall in the Home country. Since $dq_2^*/dg > 0$ in the region of $\tilde{g}$, welfare will rise for Foreign.

The fall in Home’s domestic surplus is not outweighed by the benefits of access to good 2, and there is no compensating access to the Foreign market. In the Foreign country, welfare rises even as resources are diverted to the Home market despite the high cost. Consumer surplus plus profit in the domestic market rises as output increases. Now consider the movement from uni-directional to intra-industry trade:

**Proposition 6.** A small increase in $g$ in the region of $g = \tilde{g}^*$ will lower welfare in both Home and Foreign.


Proof. Take Home first. The first term in (15) is negative. The last two terms are zero since in the region of $\tilde{g}^*$ we have $q_1^* = 0$. Hence the sign hinges on the second term. Using (9) and (10) evaluated at $\tilde{g}^*$, it can be shown that $q_2 < \gamma q_1$ iff $(4 + \gamma - 3\gamma^2 + \gamma^4)(\alpha - c) + \alpha(\gamma - \gamma^2 - \gamma^3) + \gamma c > 0$, which holds for any $\gamma < 1$ and $\alpha > c$. It follows that $dW/dg < 0$. For Foreign also we can drop the terms involving $q_1^*$ in this region. Rearranging the remaining terms using the fact that $dq_1/dg = dq_2^*/dg$ for $g \geq \tilde{g}^*$ we have:

$$\frac{dW^*}{dg} = [(1 - \gamma^2)q_2^* + \gamma q_2] \frac{dq_2^*}{dg} - \gamma q_2 \frac{dq_1^*}{dg} + \frac{cq_2}{g^2}.$$  

The first two terms are negative, since in the region of $\tilde{g}^*$ we have $dq_2^*/dg < 0$ and $dq_1^*/dg > 0$. The last term is positive. However, using (10) and (12), along with the derivative of (11) with respect to $g$, all evaluated at $\tilde{g}^*$, we can show that the sum of the last two terms is negative iff $\gamma^3 - \gamma < 0$, which is true for any $\gamma < 1$. Hence $dW^*/dg < 0$.  

We can carry out the same exercise around the vicinity of costless trade and analyze the change in welfare with a small increase in trade costs.

**Proposition 7.** A small decrease in $g$ in the region of $g = 1$ will lower economic welfare in both countries.

Proof. Begin with Home. When $g = 1$ the outcome is symmetric across markets. Rearranging (15) therefore gives us:

$$\frac{dW}{dg} = (\alpha - c) \frac{dq_1}{dg} + cq_1 + (q_2 - \gamma q_1) \frac{dq_2}{dg} - q_1 [\gamma q_2 + (1 + \gamma)q_1] \frac{dq_1}{dg}.$$  

The last two terms are positive since $dq_2/dg > 0$, $dq_1/dg < 0$ and $q_2 > \gamma q_1$ from Proposition 2 when $g = 1$. Use the derivatives of (9) and (10) with respect to $g$ in the region of $g = 1$ to rewrite the first two terms as $c(\alpha - c)(4 + 2\gamma^2 - 3\gamma)/(4 - 3\gamma^2)$, which is positive since $4 - 2\gamma^2 - 3\gamma > 0$ for $\gamma < \tilde{\gamma}$. Hence $dW/dg > 0$ at any stable equilibrium. The argument for Foreign is similar. Rewrite (16) using symmetry:

$$\frac{dW^*}{dg} = (\alpha - c - \gamma q_1) \frac{dq_2^*}{dg} - \gamma q_2^* \frac{dq_1^*}{dg} + cq_2^* + (\gamma - 1)q_2^* \frac{dq_2^*}{dg} + q_1^* \frac{dq_1^*}{dg}.$$  

10
The last three terms are positive since \( dq^* / dg < 0 \) and \( dq^*_1 / dg > 0 \). The first two terms are negative.

Using the Foreign inverse demand for good 2 we have \( \alpha - \gamma q^*_1 - c = p^*_2 - c + q^*_2 = (2 - \gamma^2)q^*_2 \). Using the derivatives of (10) and (11) with respect to \( g \) in the region of \( g = 1 \) then allows us to combine the first four terms as \( q^*_2 e(8 - 6\gamma - 8\gamma^2 + 5\gamma^3)/(8 - 6\gamma^2) \), which is positive for \( \gamma < \tilde{\gamma} \). Hence \( dW^*/dg > 0 \) at any stable equilibrium.

While Proposition 5 through Proposition 7 address the directions of changes in welfare with small changes in trade costs (changing the pattern or the structure of trade), they do not address the levels of welfare, to which we now turn. First, consider welfare in autarky (i.e., for \( g \leq \bar{g} \)). Since we know both firms operate as monopolists in at this point, it is straightforward to show that \( W_A = W^*_A = 3(\alpha - c)^2/8 \). How does this compare to free trade (\( g = 1 \))?

**Proposition 8.** With no trade costs, welfare in Foreign is unambiguously higher than autarky, while Home welfare is higher only if there is sufficient product differentiation.

**Proof.** At any \( g > \bar{g}^* \) the welfare expressions (13) and (14) can be written:

\[
W = 3q^2_1/2 + q^2_1 + q^2_2/2 \\
W^* = (3/2 - \gamma^2)q^2_2 + (1 - \gamma^2)q^2_2 + q^2_1/2
\]

Using symmetry and (9) and (10) evaluated at \( g = 1 \), we can show that \( W^* > W^*_A \) iff \( (20 - 16\gamma^2)(2 - \gamma)^2 + (8 - 4\gamma^2 - 4\gamma^2 - (12 - 3\gamma^2)^2 > 0 \), which holds for any \( \gamma < 1 \). Using the same procedure for Home, \( W > W_A \) iff \( 20(2 - \gamma^2 - \gamma^2 + 4(2 - \gamma^2)^2 - (12 - 3\gamma^2)^2 > 0 \). The critical value of \( \gamma \) evaluates to 0.73. Since \( \tilde{\gamma} \), the maximum value for stability, evaluates to 0.781, there is a range of \( \gamma \), consistent with stability, in which Home welfare falls with free trade relative to autarky.

It was already clear from Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 that Home welfare could fall below the autarky level for sufficiently low values of \( g \), and indeed this is a standard result in the reciprocal dumping literature – as the costs of trans-shipping initially exceed the benefits of increased competition and (in this model) variety. Proposition 8 goes further: Home may in fact not be better off under free trade than under autarky.

This result is best understood in the context of the firms’ asymmetric strategies. It is clear from the changes in the best response functions with \( g \) and from Figure 1 that decreasing trade
costs (increasing $g$) (i) decreases both the price of the local variety and the local output in the Home market (and thus local profits will decrease), while increasing the Foreign firm’s exports to the Home market (which will increase total output in the Home market – as is given by Proposition 2 – increasing consumer surplus; and (ii) decreases the local firm’s export price in the Foreign market, while increasing its export quantity. As $g$ approaches unity (thus trade becomes costless), competition becomes fierce, and these changes will be accentuated because the firm located in Home (choosing price over quantity) will behave even more aggressively and will lower not only the price of the local variety but also its export price in the Foreign market even more. While product differentiation helps firms decrease the intensity of competition, at a sufficiently low degree of product differentiation (when $\gamma$ is sufficiently large), it should be clear that the increase in consumer surplus will not be enough to compensate for the decrease in total profits of the firm located in Home. Thus trade will not welfare dominate autarky in Home unless products are sufficiently differentiated even when trade is costless.

Proposition 6 also shows that welfare falls in Foreign when intra-industry trade first arises. This raises the question of whether or not Foreign welfare can ever fall below the autarky level. While an analytical proof is not tractable, we offer a numerical response. Figure 2 shows the minimum difference between Foreign welfare with trade and in autarky over the entire parameter space of the model (i.e., it depicts the lower envelope of the gains from trade for Foreign). Since it is always non-negative, Foreign is never worse off under trade than autarky, and is better off for any $\gamma > 0$ and $\alpha > c$, at any $g$ at which trade arises.\(^3\)

Finally, consider whether or not Home welfare can be greater than Foreign welfare. Start with the case of free trade:

**Proposition 9.** With no trade costs, gains from trade are greater in Foreign than in Home.

**Proof.** Since the outcome is symmetric across markets, consumer welfare is the same across markets and only profits of the firms differ. By symmetry, each firm makes the same profit in each market.

\(^3\)When intra-industry trade is occurring, $W^*$ is a quasi-convex function of $g$ with a unique minimum. Taking the derivative of $W^*$ as given in Proposition 8 with respect to $g$ and using equations (9)-(12) along with their derivatives with respect to $g$, we can show that the value of $g$ that minimizes $W^*$ is $g = (12 - 9\gamma^2 - \gamma^4)\alpha - (12 - 9\gamma^2)\gamma(\alpha - c)$. The remaining parameters of the model are $\gamma$, which, assuming stability, can range from 0 to 0.781, $\alpha$, and $c$. The latter two are measured in currency units, and matter only in relation to one another. For the market to exist, $c/\alpha \in [0, 1]$. Figure 2 is constructed by numerically simulating the gain from trade at its minimum across this parameter space.
With \( g = 1 \), we can rewrite \( q_1 = (2 - \gamma^2 - \gamma)q_2/(2 - \gamma) \) from Proposition 2. Hence \( \pi_2 - \pi_1 = q_2^2(1 - \gamma^2 - [(2 - \gamma^2 - \gamma)/(2 - \gamma)]^2) \). The bracketed term is positive if and only if \( 2\gamma^3(1 - \gamma) > 0 \), which is true for \( \gamma < 1 \).

This result also generalizes to any \( g \), and we again use numerical simulation to demonstrate. The difference between \( W^\ast \) and \( W \) has a positive second derivative with respect to \( g \) and therefore a unique minimum. We evaluate that minimum over the stable parameter space of the model, and plot the lower envelope in Figure 3. Since the minimum difference is always non-negative, we conclude that Foreign is never worse off with trade than Home, and is better off for any \( \gamma > 0 \) and \( \alpha > c \), at any \( g \) at which trade arises.

Figure 4 illustrates the shapes of two possible sets of welfare paths for Home and Foreign, given the properties established in Proposition 5 through Proposition 8. In panel (a) the degree of product differentiation is relatively high, while in panel (b) it is relatively low. Between \( \bar{\gamma} \) and \( \bar{\gamma}^\ast \) welfare rises for Foreign and falls for Home. Beyond \( \bar{\gamma}^\ast \), welfare falls for both countries at first, before eventually beginning to rise. In panel (b) the level of welfare for Home is shown remaining below autarky even when \( g = 1 \).
Figure 3: Minimum Difference Between Foreign and Home Welfare

Figure 4: Path of Welfare as Trade Costs Decline
4 The Role of Product Differentiation

We have seen that the degree of product differentiation has important implications for stability, and for the welfare implications of changes in trade costs. We now consider the implications of the degree of product differentiation for our results in more detail.

First consider the values of trade costs at which the various equilibria will arise. We have shown that for values of \( g \leq \tilde{g} \), the world economy will be autarkic, with both firms producing at the monopoly level. For \( \tilde{g} < g \leq \tilde{g}^* \) uni-directional trade will occur from Foreign to Home, and the Foreign firm will react to the threat of Home entry. For \( g > \tilde{g}^* \) there will be intra-industry trade.

The effect of product differentiation on the critical \( g \) values can be summarized as follows:

**Proposition 10.** The critical values \( \tilde{g} \) and \( \tilde{g}^* \) are lower (higher) the higher (lower) the degree of product differentiation. The higher (lower) the degree of product differentiation, the greater (lesser) the difference between the critical values.

**Proof.** Taking the derivative of \( \tilde{g} \) with respect to \( \gamma \) yields
\[
d\tilde{g}/d\gamma = \frac{2c(\alpha - c)}{[\alpha(2 - \gamma) + \gamma c]^2} > 0
\]
since \( \alpha > c \) and \( 2 > \gamma \). Similarly \( d\tilde{g}^*/d\gamma = \frac{(2 + \gamma^2)c(\alpha - c)}{[\alpha(2 - \gamma - \gamma^2) + \gamma c]^2} > 0 \). The latter is clearly greater than the former, by a factor that is increasing in \( \gamma \), for \( \gamma > 0 \).

The implication is that the more homogeneous the goods are (the fiercer is product market competition), the lower trade costs will have to be in order for trade to arise, and the greater the range of trade costs for which we would observe only uni-directional trade. The reason is that lowering the degree of product differentiation reduces the scope to exploit market power. Now consider the volume of trade:

**Proposition 11.** Assuming trade exists in both directions, the volume of Home exports to Foreign falls (rises) as the degree of product differentiation falls (rises). The sign of changes in the volume of Foreign exports to Home is ambiguous.

**Proof.** Taking the derivative of (11) with respect to \( \gamma \) gives us
\[
dq_1^*/d\gamma = \frac{[4\gamma(\alpha - c/g) - 4(\alpha - c) - 3\gamma^2(\alpha - c)]/(4 - 3\gamma^2)^2 < 0}
\]
since the absolute value of the second term in the numerator is greater than the first term. By contrast, taking the derivative of (10) with respect to \( \gamma \) gives us
\[
dq_2/d\gamma = \frac{[12\gamma(\alpha - c/g) - (4 + 3\gamma^2)(\alpha - c)]/(4 - 3\gamma^2)^2 > 0}
\]
while the second is negative. When \( \gamma \) is small (high differentiation) the second term dominates.
and a small rise in $\gamma$ lowers Foreign exports. Once $\gamma$ is sufficiently large, the first term dominates, and the opposite result holds. The inflection point is where $\gamma = (12\Delta - \sqrt{144\Delta^2 - 48})/6$, where $\Delta = (\alpha - c/g)/\alpha - c$, a measure of relative market viability.

In terms of Figure 1, a fall (rise) in the value of $\gamma$ will rotate the best response function for Firm 1 outward (inward) around its vertical intercept (the monopoly price) in both markets. Similarly, a fall (rise) in the value of $\gamma$ make the best response function for Firm 2 steeper (flatter), rotating leftward (rightward) until, in the limiting case, it is vertical at the monopoly level of output.

**Proposition 12.** Assuming free trade, the gains from trade for both Home and Foreign are increasing (decreasing) in the degree of product differentiation (homogeneity).

**Proof.** Differentiating (13) and (14) and using the symmetry implied by $g = 1$ allows us to write:

$$\left.\frac{dW}{d\gamma}\right|_{g=1} = 5q_1\frac{dq_1}{d\gamma} + q_2\frac{dq_2}{d\gamma},$$

$$\left.\frac{dW^*}{d\gamma}\right|_{g=1} = (5 - 4\gamma^2)q_2\frac{dq_2}{d\gamma} - 4\gamma q_2^2 + q_1\frac{dq_1}{d\gamma}.$$

From Proposition 11 we know that for sufficiently small $\gamma$ all terms will be negative. Using (9) and (10) and the associated derivatives from Proposition 11, all evaluated at $g = 1$, we can further show that $dW/d\gamma < 0$ iff $88\gamma - 48\gamma^2 - 2\gamma^3 - 15\gamma^4 - 48 < 0$. This condition holds for any value of $\gamma < 0.88$. Since stability requires $\gamma < 0.781$, Home welfare at free trade is decreasing in $\gamma$ for all stable equilibria. Following the same procedure for Foreign, we can show that $dW^*/d\gamma < 0$ iff $88\gamma - 66\gamma^3 - 27\gamma^4 - 48 < 0$. This condition holds for $\gamma < 0.82$. Hence, Foreign welfare at free trade is also decreasing in $\gamma$ for all stable equilibria.

We conclude this section with some comments about what happens at the extreme values of $\gamma$. When $\gamma = 0$ the products are distinct, and each firm will simply supply the monopoly level of output (evaluated at the appropriate marginal cost of supply) to each market. Intra-industry trade will occur provided that $g > c/\alpha$. Such trade is certainly welfare improving for both countries, since both firms will accrue greater profits from access to another market, while suffering no loss in profits from ‘rival’ entry into their own market. Moreover, consumers in both markets will gain
access to a variety that they value, albeit at an artificially high price. When \( g = 1 \), welfare in both countries is in fact double the autarky level.

At the other extreme, when \( \gamma = 1 \) the products are perfectly homogeneous. The equilibrium is not stable for \( \tilde{\gamma} < \gamma < 1 \). However, as Tremblay and Tremblay (2011) argue, a unique and stable Nash equilibrium does arise in the case of perfect homogeneity. It has some interesting characteristics. First note that if \( \gamma = 1 \), \( \tilde{g}^* = 1 \). Hence, the Home firm choosing price over quantity cannot be competitive in the Foreign market. Trade, if it occurs, must be uni-directional. If \( g > 2c/(\alpha + c) \) exports will arise from Foreign to Home. In fact, if \( g = 1 \) the Foreign firm becomes the exclusive supplier of the entire world market, but at price equal to marginal cost. If \( 2c/(\alpha + c) < g < 1 \) the Foreign firm will price in both markets at \( c/g \), with the Home firm remaining active only in the Home market.

Figure 5: Best Responses and Nash Equilibrium in Home and Foreign with Homogeneous Goods

Figure 5 illustrates a possible outcome. In the Home market, the Foreign best response function is horizontal at \( c/g \). The equilibrium is at \( a \). Since price is above marginal cost, the Home firm continues to produce. In the Foreign market, the Foreign best response function is vertical above point \( b \), which represents the monopoly outcome. It is horizontal at \( c \) until point \( d \), which is the competitive output level. Equilibrium is at \( a \), with only Firm 2 active.
Will trade increase welfare when the goods are homogeneous? Certainly free trade \((g = 1)\) must be superior to autarky for both Foreign and Home, perhaps surprisingly in the case of the latter in light of Proposition 8, since the competitive outcome is reached in both economies rather than the monopoly outcome. When trade costs are high, however, Home may still lose from trade (although Foreign welfare necessarily rises), when the benefits of a lower price to consumers are not enough to compensate for the shift in profits from the Home to the Foreign firm.

5 Concluding Comments

Symmetry is obviously a powerful means of simplifying models of strategic interaction such as those adopted in the literature on intra-industry trade. But recent work has suggested that the adoption of asymmetric strategies is possible in theory and is observed commonly in various markets (e.g., ranging from the aerospace connector industry to small cars in the U.S., to home electronics industry in Japan). As we have demonstrated in this paper, this feature of firm behavior has significant implications for the pattern and potential benefits of international trade. A point of particular note is the fact that the asymmetry might help us to understand why uni-directional trade might arise for some goods prior to intra-industry trade as trade costs decline over time, and that this may not simply be a matter of technological superiority. Another is the fact that sufficient product differentiation is required such that international trade might be beneficial for all participants in the absence of any trade costs as a result of asymmetric strategy choice. This result seems to be entirely novel.

There are a number of possible extensions to our work. It would be valuable to consider the implications of free entry in either or both markets, as in Friberg and Ganslandt (2008). Also It would be interesting to endogenize the degree of product differentiation as in Brander and Spencer (2015), and/or transportation costs as in Ishikawa and Tarui (2018). Exploring the possibilities for strategic trade policy (in the spirit of Brander and Spencer, 1985, and Easton and Grossman, 1985) in this type of situation may also be useful. Abstracting from the consumer side of the problem and focusing on the profit shifting motive, it is clear that asymmetric trade policy interventions would arise: an export tax for Foreign and an export subsidy for Home. Finally, we have considered only one type of strategic asymmetry, but there are others. In our model the product differentiation is
horizontal, but in a market with vertical differentiation we might envisage international markets where some firms compete in price or quantity and others compete along the quality dimension, for example.

References


